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NOTES
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION FOR THE HEARING
IMPAIRED: AN UNEASY PARTNERSHIP
BETWEEN THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION AND THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
The Communications Act of 1934' was adopted to secure the maximum
benefits of broadcasting for the American people.2 To carry out this prom-
ise, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was created to regu-
late the new medium and to grant broadcast licenses for the "public
interest, convenience, and necessity."3 This public interest standard is
quite general and is not defined in the Act itself.4 Rather, the standard was
intended as a "supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the ex-
pert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy."5
The Commission's public interest determinations are appealable to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under
section 402 of the Communications Act.6 The scope of judicial review is
governed by section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),7
1. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
2. Id; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943).
3. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 307-309 (1976).
4. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1981). See also 47
U.S.C. §§ 151, 307(b) (1976) (identifying certain components of adequate broadcasting serv-
ice, including rapid and efficient communication service for all citizens so far as is possible,
adequate facilities at reasonable charges, a provision for national defense and safety of life
and property, and a fair, efficient and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the
states and communities). Beyond these general pronouncements the Act is silent as to the
meaning of "public interest, convenience and necessity." The terms are not included in the
definitional section of the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
5. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976). The Act authorizes appeals from FCC decisions and or-
ders to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in eight
specific situations. Actions other than those specified may be brought in the United States
court of appeals in the circuit of the filing party's residence or principal place of business, or
in the District of Columbia Circuit. 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1976).
7. Section 10(e) is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). Reviewing courts shall "hear and
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which allows the reviewing court to "decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the mean-
ing or applicability of the terms of an agency action."8 The dual responsi-
bility of the FCC and the court to interpret the Communication Act's
public interest mandate has been labelled "a 'partnership' in furtherance
of the public interest" among " 'collaborative instrumentalities' of justice"9
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
A question facing the "partners" is whether, as a matter of law, national
policies embodied in statutes other than the Communications Act must be
incorporated into the public interest standard. More specifically, the ques-
tion is whether the public interest standard encompasses section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.3°
Recently, in Gottfried v. FCC,"' the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the issue whether section 504
requires public broadcasters, by virtue of their federal subsidy, to serve the
determine the appeal upon the record before it in the manner prescribed by section 10(e) of
the Administrative Procedure Act." 47 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
9. The "partnership doctrine" was first articulated by the District of Columbia Circuit
in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). Within this framework it is the Commission's responsibility to
find facts, make judgments, and select policies in the public interest, while the court must
determine the outer limits of the Communications Act. Id The District of Columbia Circuit
described the division of labor between the judicial and administrative partners as follows:
This court has neither the expertise nor the constitutional 'authority' to make pol-
icy as that word is commonly understood .... That role is reserved to the Con-
gress, and, within the bounds of delegated authority, to the Commission. But in
matters of interpreting the 'law' the final word is constitutionally committed to the
judiciary.
Id
10. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . .shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.
11. 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (Nos.
81-298, 81-799) (the Supreme Court consolidated the petitions of two parties, the Federal
Communications Commission (No. 81-799) and Community Television of Southern Cali-
fornia KCET-TV (No. 81-298), but denied the joint petition of Sue Gottfried and the
Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. (No. 81-651)). 102 S. Ct. at 1004.
Gottfried and the Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness (GLAD) are involved in
another initiative to secure television services for the hearing impaired. They filed suit in
Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc., v. Community Television, No. CV 78-
4715R (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1981), stayed, No. 81-5952 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 1981) in which the
United States District Court for the Central District of California recently ordered federal
executive departments to cut off funds to public television stations that did not provide open
captioning for the deaf. For an explanation of various captioning types see infra note 105.
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needs of the hearing impaired in their viewing areas, and whether the FCC
must enforce this obligation through the public interest standard.' 2 The
court reversed an FCC ruling that the Commission was not the appropri-
ate agency for enforcement of section 504 since that task had been dele-
gated to the funding agencies.' 3 Additionally, the court ordered the FCC
to schedule hearings to determine if renewal of the license of KCET-TV,
the noncommercial station involved in the proceeding, would be in the
public interest. 14
The case arose when Sue Gottfried, a hearing impaired individual, and
the Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. (GLAD) petitioned the
FCC to deny the 1977 license renewal applications of seven commercial
and one noncommercial television station in Los Angeles, California.' 5
The petition alleged that the licensees had failed to ascertain the needs of
their hearing impaired audience,' 6 and that programming for this group
had been generally deficient, thus constituting unlawful discrimination
against the handicapped. 7 The Commission denied the petitions ini-
12. Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 317.
13. Id. at 304-06.
14. Id. at 310. The Court of Appeals stayed issuance of its order pending disposition of
petitions for writ of certiorari. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari of KCET-TV, No. 81-298,
Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (U.S. Jan. 11,
1982). KCET-TV was one of three petitioners for certiorari. See supra note 11.
15. 655 F.2d at 300 n. 1, 304-05. GLAD is an umbrella organization that represents ap-
proximately 40 organizations serving the hearing impaired in the Los Angeles area. The
Commission denied standing to GLAD in this proceeding because of lack of a formal dem-
onstration that its constituent members supported the petition. License Renewal Applica-
tions, 69 F.C.C.2d 451, 453 n.5 (1978), reconsideration denied, 72 F.C.C.2d 273, 280 (1979).
Although Gottfried was, therefore, the only party officially recognized as a petitioner by the
FCC, id, on appeal the District of Columbia Circuit court formally recognized GLAD as an
appellant. Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 304-05 n.32.
Broadcasters are licensed under the Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976). At
the end of each term, licensees must apply to the Commission for renewal. 47 U.S.C. § 308
(1976). Section 309(d)(1) provides:
Any party in interest may file with the Commission a petition to deny any applica-
tion. . . . The petition shall contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show
that the petitioner is a party in interest and that a grant of the application would be
prima facie inconsistent with . . . [the public interest, convenience and necessity].
It is well established that members of the broadcast audience are interested parties within
the meaning of this section. E.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
16. FCC procedures require television broadcasters to ascertain the interests and needs
of their audience through two mechanisms, a general public survey and a community leader
survey. See Renewal Primer, 57 F.C.C.2d 418 (1976). Licensees must inquire into the service
needs of their listeners, considering 19 specific categories. Id at 447, App. D. There is, how-
ever, no requirement that broadcasters ascertain the needs of the hearing impaired. See
License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d at 456.
17. License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d at 452. Gottfried alleged that the televi-
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tially,I8 and again on rehearing,' 9 for failure to raise a "substantial or ma-
terial question" of fact.2" On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed with respect to noncommercial station KCET-TV and ordered an
evidentiary hearing on the petition to deny its license.2 '
sion stations failed to include programming designed to meet the special needs of the hear-
ing impaired, and that station KCET-TV refused to air a particular program, the Captioned
ABC News, until May 23, 1977. When KCET-TV finally aired the program it was at an
inappropriate time for the hearing impaired audience (11:30 p.m.). Id at 458 n.9.
Petitioner reasoned that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applied to broadcast licensees,
and that failure to meet the programming needs of the hearing impaired constituted a viola-
tion of the public interest standard. The claim was based on two grounds. First, petitioner
argued that broadcast licenses themselves confer significant financial benefits on their hold-
ers and thus constitute "federal financial assistance" within the scope of § 504. Second,
KCET-TV, as a public, noncommercial broadcaster received congressional appropriations
through various federal agencies. Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 306, 312.
18. License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d 451 (1978).
19. License Renewal Applications, 72 F.C.C.2d 273 (1979), denying reconsideration of
69 F.C.C.2d 451 (1978).
20. Id Under the Communications Act, the Commission is required to hold evidentiary
hearings on a petition to deny a license only if a substantial or material question of fact is
presented, or if the FCC finds, for any reason, that license renewal would not be in the
public interest. 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(d)(2), 309(e) (1976). A petition to deny a license must con-
tain allegations sufficient to uphold a determination that license renewal would be "prima
facie inconsistent with the public interest." 47 U.S.C. § 308 (1976). See supra note 15. See
also Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (requiring a hearing only when a
petition to deny makes substantial and specific allegations of fact which, if true, would indi-
cate that granting the application would be prima facie inconsistent with the public interest);
Alianza Federal de Mercedes v. FCC, 539 F.2d 732, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (hearing not re-
quired when facts are undisputed or when the case turns on inferences to be drawn from
facts already known and legal conclusions to be derived from those facts). In Gottried, the
FCC had concluded that no substantial question of fact had been raised. The licensees
merely failed "to do something that we have not required them to do." License Renewal
Applications, 72 F.C.C.2d at 280. See also Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 305.
21. Gottried, 655 F.2d at 316. The Commission's decision with respect to the seven
commercial stations was upheld. Id Because the court found that § 504 was not intended to
apply to commercial stations as a "specific statutory [obligation]" it did not require the FCC
to schedule hearings. Id at 315. Nevertheless, the court determined that licensees have an
obligation to meet the needs of the hearing impaired due to the general national policy of
the Rehabilitation Act, as incorporated through the public interest standard of the Commu-
nications Act. Id at 314-15.
The court stated:
[W]e recognize that the Commission's statutory obligation to pursue the public in-
terest requires it to protect the interests of the hard of hearing in having meaning-
ful access to commercial broadcasting. . . . Radio has been available to the
general public for over half a century. . . . But millions of Americans have lived
and died during that time without being able to enjoy radio and television simply
because their hearing was impaired. It is time for the Commission to act realisti-
cally to require, in the public interest, that the benefits of television be made avail-
able to the hard of hearing now.
Id at 301. In the case of the commercial licensees the court deferred to the Commission's
discretion in determining the best method of serving the deaf. Id at 315-16. But the court
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In reaching its decision, the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged
the Commission's leading role in determining broadcast policy.22 None-
theless, the court saw the public interest as an "irreducible element of law"
which it must apply as part of its "inescapable judicial role."23 The Gott-
fried decision did not require the Commission to adjudicate violations of
section 504, but rather, "to effectuate the underlying national policy" of
the Rehabilitation Act by incorporating it into the public interest stan-
dard.24 To support its holding, the court cited examples of other national
policies, such as antitrust and antidiscrimination, that had been incorpo-
rated into the public interest standard.25 Judge McGowan dissented from
warned that "judicial action might become appropriate at a later date" if the FCC failed to
implement the policy of the Rehabilitation Act. Id at 316. The Supreme Court refused to
review the court's ruling with respect to the commercial stations. Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari of Sue Gottfried and GLAD, No. 81-651, Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1004 (U.S. Jan 11, 1982). See supra note 11.
22. Id at 307-08. "In construing this standard we must of course accord substantial
deference to the Commission's judgments."
23. Id at 308. The court cited National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
224-26 (1943) for the proposition that the public interest standard contains an irreducible
element of law. The Supreme Court in National Broadcasting Co. held that the public inter-
est standard is not impermissibly vague and that the Commission has primary responsibility
for its interpretation. Id at 224.
24. Gott/ried, 655 F.2d at 311. Although the District of Columbia Circuit denied that its
ruling would require the FCC to enforce violations of § 504, it pointed out that the Commis-
sion would be able to incorporate its policy into the public interest standard regardless of
whether the funding agencies assessed violations against the stations. The Supreme Court
has agreed to hear argument, on whether the FCC may enforce laws that are committed to
the charge of other agencies. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. granted 102 S. Ct. 998 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (petition of the FCC, No. 81-799). See
supra note 11.
25. Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 308-10. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 224-26 (1943) and Johnson Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C.
Cir. 1949), both of which allowed the FCC to take antitrust policies into account when
defining the public interest.
With respect to antidiscrimination statutes, the court cited instances in which the Com-
mission has applied policies from statutes other than the Communications Act, National
Org. For Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (FCC considers employment
discrimination to the extent it affects licensees' ability to program for all listeners and to the
extent such practices raise questions about the licensee's character); Nondiscrimination in the
Employment Policies and Practices ofBroadcast Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d 222 (1976); Nondis-
crimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968), and
instances in which the District of Columbia Circuit has ordered enforcement of nondiscrimi-
nation policies. Black Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 556 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (FCC
ordered to enforce antidiscrimination policies); Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (FCC required to enforce fairness
policies to end discriminatory practices by a licensee). To support the proposition that the
Rehabilitation Act falls within the public interest standard of the Communications Act, the
court principally relied upon NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 670 n.7 (1976).
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the ruling with respect to the noncommercial station, arguing that FCC
action should not take place until those agencies charged with section 504
enforcement responsibilities had developed compliance guidelines.26
This Note will examine the extent to which the Federal Communica-
tions Commission is required under the public interest standard to incor-
porate the mandates of other national policies, and whether this is
consistent with the level of agency discretion espoused by the "partnership
doctrine." It will also analyze the logical consistency of the Gottfried opin-
ion, which set different public interest requirements for commercial and
noncommercial broadcasters.
I. THE PUBLIC INTEREST, CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY: THE FCC's
DOMAIN
The Federal Communications Commission has primary authority for
regulating broadcasting in the United States, including the duty to grant or
deny station licenses, assign frequencies, establish hours of operation and
power levels, and establish general broadcasting policies.27 The Commis-
sion has a statutory mandate to promote the "public interest, convenience,
and necessity."2 The standard is quite general, and the FCC has histori-
cally defined it through decisions on specific licenses and through issuance
of policy guidelines.29 The Commission's current practice is dominated by
26. Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 316-17.
27. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 309(a), 309(d) (1976). See supra notes 3-4.
28. Id See generally B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, 5 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 41.02
(1981) (discussion of use of the public interest standard in licensing decisions) [hereinafter
cited as ADMINISTRATIVE LAW].
29. The agency's practice of issuing policy pronouncements in the course of individual
license renewal proceedings began with the FCC's predecessor agency, the Federal Radio
Commission. See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. (FRC Docket No. 4900) 3 F.R.C. ANN.
REP. 32 (1929). The FCC has continued this practice. See generally W. EMERY, BROADCAST-
ING AND GOVERNMENT 354-67 (197 1). The FCC made its first comprehensive attempt to set
guidelines for the public interest through issuance of a report called the "Blue Book." FCC,
PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (Mar. 7, 1946), reprinted in F.
KAHN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 151 (1973). Although the report did not
have the force of law, the Commission used the criteria it established to evaluate the per-
formance of licensees when they sought renewal. Named by station owners for the color of
its binding, the Blue Book concentrated on four indices of the public interest: (1) carrying
sustaining programs, (2) carrying local live programming, (3) carrying programs devoted to
public discussions, and (4) eliminating commercial advertising excesses. In a discussion of
these issues the report concluded: "It has long been established policy of broadcasters them-
selves and of the Commission that the American system of broadcasting must serve signifi-
cant minorities among our population, and the less dominant needs and tastes which
listeners have from time to time." Id at 180. The public interest served by meeting the needs
of minorities set forth in the Blue Book was predicated on promoting diversity in program-
ming, not providing a service to discrete minority populations.
[Vol. 31:699
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the use of rules which it promulgates to define the public interest obliga-
tions of licensees. 30 The same rules apply to both commercial and noncom-
mercial broadcasters almost without exception. 3' To ensure conformity
with the statutory mandate, FCC public interest determinations, whether
made in a licensing decision or through the use of rules, are subject to
judicial review pursuant to section 706 of the APA.32
A. Judicial Involvement in the Regulatory Process
The scope of review of agency actions, such as those taken by the FCC,
depends on whether the action in question is based on legal or factual
30. Rules are quasi-legislative pronouncements that pertain to all licensees of the class
being regulated. Rules have a prospective effect only, and cannot be applied to the past
practices of those being regulated. Authority for the FCC to promulgate rules is granted in
47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976):
Except as otherwise provided in ... [the Communication's Act of 1934], the Com-
mission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires,
shall-
(r) Make such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions,
not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of...
[the Communications Act of 1934] ....
The FCC rulemaking process is an informal one and does not require the use of formal
adjudicatory proceedings. Such procedures are prescribed by the Administrative Procedure
Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) (notice and comment rulemaking). For a general discussion of the
process of administrative rulemaking, especially within the FCC, see ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
supra note 28, at § 41.06.
The use of rules to define the public interest is known as the Storer doctrine. The practice
was first approved by the Supreme Court in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192 (1956) (upholding FCC rules limiting the number of broadcast outlets which could
be owned by a single licensee). Because rulemaking avoids costly and time-consuming hear-
ings and effectively resolves matters of industry-wide importance with uniformity, it is pre-
ferred by both the Commission and the courts. See, e.g., National Org. For Women v. FCC,
555 F.2d 1002, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (individual license renewals denied because the matter
was one of industry-wide importance and more appropriately addressed through rulemak-
ing); Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (basic changes in policy are better and
more fairly examined in rulemaking proceedings than in licensing actions).
31. Community-Service Broadcasting v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (striking
down a requirement that public stations, but not commercial stations, retain recordings of
public affairs programs). Commercial licensees are no less public trustees of the airwaves
than noncommercial licensees, id at 1121, and both are subject to exactly the same fairness
requirements. Id at 1123. Georgia State Bd. of Educ., 70 F.C.C.2d 948, reconsideration de-
nied, 71 F.C.C.2d 227 (1979), a~fdmem., No. 79-1431 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 1980) (the FCC
has always imposed the same general programming obligations on both commercial and
noncommercial licensees).
One difference between public interest policies for commercial and noncommercial sta-
tions is that noncommercial stations are prohibited by law from editorializing. 47 U.S.C.
§ 399(a) (1976). See also Note, Freeing Public Broadcastingfrom Unconstitutional Restraints,
89 YALE L.J. 719, 730 n.78 (1980).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976) (incorporating 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976)). See supra note 7.
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issues.33 Under the APA, courts generally are allowed to substitute their
judgment for that of regulatory agencies on matters of law, 34 while an
agency's resolution of factual issues must be upheld unless it is "arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion."35
Although reviewing courts are granted wide latitude to resolve legal is-
sues, certain factors cause judges to accord greater deference to statutory
interpretations made by regulatory agencies. Where Congress has dele-
gated the authority to administer the subject matter covered by the statute
as well as the power to make policy, reviewing courts are more reluctant to
substitute their judgment for that of the agency.36 This is especially true
when the subject matter of the regulation is complex or technical and re-
quires the judgment of an expert agency.37
B. Regulatory Partnersh of the FCC and the United States Court of
Appealsfor the District of Columbia Circuit
The relationship between the FCC and the District of Columbia Circuit
33. Questions of law involve interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions and
determination of the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1976). Questions of fact involve findings about the parties involved in the regulatory
action. For example, determining whether a given party is in compliance with a statutory
mandate involves questions of both law and fact. The requirement imposed by the statute is
an issue of law, while determining whether the party's actions conform to the law is a factual
issue. See Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899, 899 (1943). The
distinction between a question of law and one of fact is not always easy to discern, and no
definite criteria facilitate such a task. Id (citing REP. ATr'Y GEN. COMM. AD. PROC. 88
(1941)).
34. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556 n.20 (1979) (judicial
deference to agency determinations must be constrained by the clear meaning of the en-
abling statute); see ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 28 at § 51.01 (general discussion of the
scope of judicial review).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency."). Where there is a rational basis for the agency finding, it cannot be set aside by
a reviewing court as arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Only those conclusions
without basis in fact may be reversed by the reviewing court. An agency decision cannot be
set aside simply because the court disagrees. Id See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 28, at
§ 51.03 (general discussion of judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard).
36. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("It]his Court shows great deference to
the interpretation given the statute by the ... agency charged with its administration.");
FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 391 (1959) (agency's longstanding interpretation of its
enabling statute is to be given great deference by reviewing courts).
37. FPC Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 (1961) ("a forecast of the
direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the
expert knowledge of the agency"); but see Public Serv. Comm'n v. FERC, 589 F.2d 542, 553
n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (deference to an agency's public interest projections diminishes as
courts and agencies became more familiar with the new regulatory scheme).
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is typical of the relationship between an agency and a court prescribed in
the Administrative Procedure Act. In Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC the District of Columbia Circuit described the relationship as a
"partnership" in furtherance of the public interest.38 Within this frame-
work, the Commission is empowered to "find facts and to make judg-
ments" and also to "select policies deemed in the public interest."39 It is
the function of the court to ensure that the agency has given reasoned con-
sideration to all material facts and issues and that the decision conforms
with the requirements of the Communications Act." Although consistent
with the APA, the basic question which has confronted the Commission
and the court is the amount of discretion the FCC should be granted when
interpreting the public interest requirements of the law. 4'
This question was addressed in a series of decisions known as the "for-
mat cases," in which the District of Columbia Circuit attempted to order
the FCC to hold hearings whenever a license transfer involved a change in
entertainment formats42 to which the audience objected.43 After the Dis-
38. Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 28, at § 51.01 & n.27; see also supra note 7.
39. Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851.
40. Id
41. Although one Commissioner has expressed the view that the agency is "junior part-
ner" in the relationship, Development of Policy, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 882-83 (1976) (separate
statement of Comm'r Robinson), the District of Columbia Circuit has characterized itself
and the Commission as equals. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 482
(D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[i]f our relationship with the Commision ... is to remain a partnership,
we must not succumb to the temptation of casting ourselves in the unsuited role ofprimus
inter pares.").
42. The entertainment format of a broadcast outlet is the type of programming that
dominates its offerings to the public. Typical radio formats include, for example, "top 40,"
"country and western," "religious," "MOR" (middle of the road), "classical," or "progres-
sive rock." A format change occurs when a station alters its predominant program structure.
See Note, District of Columbia Circuit Vacates FCC Decision Not to Promulgate Rules Which
Would Require a Hearing When Assignee of Broadcast License Proposes Change in Entertain-
ment Programming Format of Station, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 362, 362 n.3 (1980).
43. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en
banc) (FCC decision not to order hearings reversed); Citizen's Comm. to Keep Progressive
Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (FCC decision not to hold hearings reversed
with respect to proposed change from progressive rock to middle of the road format); Lake-
wood Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (station's change from
all news to country and western format without hearings upheld); Citizen's Comm. to Pre-
serve the Voice of the Arts v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (FCC ordered to conduct
hearings on proposed change from classical music to popular favorites format).
The format cases typically involved the transfer of a broadcast license, a decision by the
assignee to adopt a new format, and an FCC decision to grant the application for license
assignment despite public protest. These decisions raised the question whether the District of
Columbia Circuit could require as a matter of law the use of hearings by the FCC for a
license transfer when a significant portion of the audience objected to a proposed format
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trict of Columbia Circuit ordered the Commission to hold hearings on a
proposed format change in Citizen's Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC,44
the FCC issued a policy statement 45 rejecting the court's reading of the
Communications Act with the conclusion: "We must refrain from the de-
tailed supervision of entertainment formats which the court of appeals
holds to be a part of the Commission's statutory responsibilities. 46 Basing
its authority to reach a contrary finding on the "partnership doctrine" ar-
ticulated by the District of Columbia Circuit in Greater Boston Televi-
sion , the Commission concluded that allowing free rein to market forces
would best achieve the goal of programming diversity.48
The court reasserted its position vis a vis the Commission by vacating
the policy statement in WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC.49 The District of
Columbia Circuit maintained that the decision was also sanctioned by the
partnership doctrine because mandating hearings in format cases was re-
quired by law and was a proper exercise of judicial authority." The court
denied that it was attempting to make policy, which it conceded was the
province of the Commission. 5 On review, the Supreme Court reversed the
District of Columbia Circuit and specifically upheld the Commission's pol-
icy statement.52 In so doing, the Court reaffirmed the proposition that judi-
cial review of FCC public interest determinations is quite narrow, calling
the public interest standard "a supple instrument for the exercise of discre-
change. In the court's view, hearings were required by the Communications Act's public
interest requirements, and the Commission's function was limited to determining whether
the public outcry raised a substantial or material question of fact. The cases culminated in
the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) in
which the Commission's discretion not to hold hearings was upheld. For a general discus-
sion of the format cases, see Note, supra note 42, at 364; see also Note, Development of New
Public Interest Standards in the "Format Change" Cases, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 364 (1976);
RECENT DECISIONS, Citizen's Comm. to save WEFM v. FCC, 9 GA. L. REV. 479 (1975).
44. 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45. Development of Policy, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976) (memorandum opinion and order).
The report was issued after the Commission conducted hearings on the propriety of FCC
involvement in the selection of entertainment formats and ordered a staff study on the issue.
Notice of Inquiry, 57 F.C.C.2d 580 (1976).
46. Development of Policy, 60 F.C.C.2d at 861.
47. Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Development of
Policy, 60 F.C.C.2d at 865-66 ("[w]hen such 'partners' come to a point of fundamental disa-
greement, it is incumbent upon us to take a step back and rethink our entire position if this
relationship is to be creative rather than destructive.").
48. Development of Policy, 60 F.C.C.2d at 861.
49. 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
50. Id at 857.
51. Id The court stated that it had neither the expertise nor the constitutional authority
to make policy. See supra note 9.
52. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
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tion by the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legisla-
tive policy."53
The WNCN Listeners Guild decision is consistent with a long line of
holdings by both the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Circuit
which have accorded substantial deference to the FCC's statutory interpre-
tations.54 To be consistent with the statutory mandate, courts have ruled
that the FCC need only make a reasonable interpretation of the Commu-
nications Act. The Commission is not bound to adopt the most reasonable,
or the only reasonable interpretation.55
Deference to FCC interpretations of the Communications Act and pub-
lic interest requirements stems from the unique characteristics of the
agency and the subject matter of regulation. ,The Commission has been
involved since its inception with interpretation of the Act.56 Broadcasting
is a complex technical field, subject to rapid innovation and the Commis-
sion is imbued with the requisite flexibility and technical expertise to cope
with the demands of regulating this dynamic phenomenon. 57 Courts have
traditionally shown great deference to the interpretations of agencies pos-
sessing these qualities.5"
Whenever the Commission makes a public interest determination,
whether in a licensing or a rulemaking action, the agency must apply its
53. Id at 593 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)).
54. See FCC v. National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 803 (1978)
(reviewing court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the FCC); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (construction of a statute by those
charged with its execution should be followed absent compelling indications the agency was
wrong); FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946) ("[I]t is the Commission, not the
courts, which must be satisfied that the public interest will be served by renewing the li-
cense."); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(FCC has leading role in formulating broadcast policy, not reviewing courts); Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d 519, 524 n. 19 (D.C. Cir.
1972) ("[A]n appellate court should not substitute its own judgment of what is in the public
interest without substantial guidance from extrinsic sources that the Commission's judgment
is incorrect.").
55. National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 796 (FCC regulations need
only be a reasonable means of achieving policy goals); Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 590 F.2d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (statutory interpreta-
tion with reasonable basis in law should be sustained, even if it is not the only reasonable
interpretation).
56. See National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 224 (1943).
57. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 638 n.37 (1976)
("The substantial discretion generally allowed the FCC in determining both what and how it
can properly regulate, is often attributed to the highly complex and rapidly expanding na-
ture of communications technology. Because Congress could neither foresee nor easily com-
prehend the fast-moving developments in the field, it 'gave the Commission not . ..
niggardly but expansive powers.' ").
58. See supra notes 36 & 37.
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expertise to more than statutory construction. Four distinct questions must
be addressed by the FCC before taking any action. As has been discussed,
the FCC must first determine the public interest requirements imposed by
the Communications Act.59 Second, the FCC must make a factual finding,
either from applications and petitions in licensing proceedings6" or notice
and comment procedures in rulemaking,6' to determine whether action is
warranted under the circumstances. Third, the Commission must weigh
the competing interests and fashion a policy which, in the agency's estima-
tion, will most effectively promote the public interest.62 Finally, the FCC
must choose from a range of procedural options, deciding which regula-
tory tool most appropriately addresses the interest involved.63
When the FCC chooses among competing policies, it considers the effect
of its action on the broadcasting system as a whole.64 This balancing pro-
cess necessarily involves tradeoffs between interests which are recognized
as valid public interest concerns. Faced with this choice, the FCC is
obliged to seek a utilitarian balance to secure the greatest good for the
greatest number of listeners. In WNCN Listeners Guild, the Commission
had to weigh the competing values of programming diversity and format
innovation.65 Although diversity was acknowledged as an established pub-
lic interest goal, the FCC concluded that requiring hearings on format
changes when licenses are transferred would intrude on licensee discretion
and reduce innovation in radio programming.66 The Supreme Court up-
held this conclusion as a rational accommodation of competing public in-
terest policies.67
59. See supra note 54.
60. Procedures for license applications and petitions to deny licenses are governed by 47
U.S.C. §§ 308, 309 (1976). See supra note 15.
61. See supra note 30.
62. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981); FCC v. National Citi-
zen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 803-05, 810 (1978).
63. For issues of industry-wide impact, the Commission usually relies on rulemaking,
which governs all licensees. See supra note 36. In licensing actions, the FCC has a great deal
of flexibility. It may grant a license for a temporary period instead of a full term, it may
approve a license subject to such conditions as the agency may prescribe, or the FCC may
modify the terms of a license. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 309, 316 (1976). For a general discussion of
licensing options, see ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 28, at § 41.02.
64. The Commission is concerned with a generalized notion of the public interest. Net-
work Project v. FCC, 511 F.2d 786, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[tlhe Commission should con-
sider whether the new service will create a net benefit to the communications system as a
whole. ... )
65. 450 U.S. at 587-88.
66. Development of Policy, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976).
67. WNCNListeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 596 ("[d]iversity is not the only policy the Com-
mission must consider in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Act. The Commission's im-
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The FCC has employed this balancing process for other types of inter-
ests as well. In FCC v. National Citizen's Committeefor Broadcasting,68 the
Commission applied prospectively rules which would limit combined own-
ership of newspaper and broadcasting stations. The policy was based on
the Commission's determination that strict application of divestiture rules
would disrupt service and reduce local ownership.6 9 Again, the Court up-
held the balance struck by the agency.7° These decisions reflect the part-
nership doctrine philosophy that policy choices are a matter of agency, not
judicial concern."
Once the Commission has decided to implement a given policy, it has
broad discretion to select the procedural remedy it considers to be most
appropriate.72 However, there is a general presumption that when the mat-
ter under consideration is an industry-wide practice, the FCC should insti-
tute rulemaking proceedings and avoid time-consuming hearings.7 3 The
legislative purpose of the Communications Act is to avoid time-consuming
hearings whenever possible.74 The FCC's discretion to request more infor-
mation from an applicant whose application is deficient rather than to
plementation of the public-interest standard, when based on a rational weighing of
competing policies, is not to be set aside by the Court of Appeals .
68. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
69. National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 804. Diversity of broadcast-
ing facility ownership is a well-established goal of the Communications Act. See, e.g., Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (FCC authority to adopt
network regulations upheld); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956)
(rules limiting station ownership upheld).
70. National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 805 ("[W]e agree that diver-
sification of ownership furthers statutory and constitutional policies, and, as the Commission
recognized, separating existing newspaper-broadcast combinations would promote diversifi-
cation.. . . [W]e are unable to find anything in the Communications Act, the First Amend-
ment, or the Commission's past or present practices that would require the Commission to
'presume' that its diversification policy should be given controlling weight in all circum-
stances."). Id at 810.
71. See supra note 9.
72. See WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981); Rogers Radio Communication
Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1225, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[t]he decision whether to hold
hearings 'is a matter in which the Commission's discretion. . . is paramount.' "); National
Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, 591 F.2d 812, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting Colum-
bus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320, 324 (1974)) (FCC discretion is extensive
in decision of whether to hold hearings).
73. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). See also supra note 30 for a discussion
of rulemaking.
74. Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 630 n.34 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) ("A license renewal hearing where. . . there is no other applicant for the license,
can be an unnecessarily costly and time-consuming procedure, and the Congressional pur-
pose is to avoid such hearings whenever possible."). See supra note 30.
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schedule hearings is well established." These practices constitute the pro-
cess by which the Commission implements the public interest. But before
the FCC can institute a given rule or make a licensing decision, it must
first determine the direction in which the public interest lies.
C To Incorporate or Not to Incorporate.- What Does the
Communications Act Require?
Agencies whose statutory mandate directs them to uphold the public in-
terest often look to other national policies to discern that term's meaning.76
This is particularly true when the enabling statute includes directives that
other policies be taken into account. For example, the Interstate Com-
merce Act77 allows the Interstate Commerce Commission to approve
mergers of transportation companies only if it determines the transaction
will be "consistent with the public interest and will . . . not unduly re-
strain competition."7" Where other policies are incorporated, regulatory
agencies generally have substantial discretion in defining the public inter-
est,79 and in weighing it against other policies promoted by the enabling
statute.80 The general rule is that the agency does not have the authority to
enforce the incorporated policy, but may use it to define the public interest
to the extent-and only to the extent-that it supports the regulatory pur-
pose of the agency's enabling statute.8 '
75. Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media, 595 F.2d at 630 n.34. Nothing in 47
U.S.C. §§ 309(d)(2) & 309(e) requires the Commission to schedule hearings if an initial ap-
plication fails to convince the FCC that granting the license would promote the public
interest.
76. E.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 961 (1968) ("[such] laws are
merely another tool which a regulatory agency employs ... to give 'understandable content
to the broad statutory concept of the "public interest."'" (quoting F.M.C. v. Aktiebolaget
Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 244 (1968)).
77. 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
78. 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(b) (1976).
79. Eg., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944) (ICC decision that
a merger would serve the public interest despite potential antitrust implications approved
based on that agency's broad discretion to make such determinations).
80. Northern Natural Gas Co., 399 F.2d at 961 ("[njor are the agencies strictly bound by
the dictates of these laws, for they can and do approve actions which violate antitrust poli-
cies where other economic, social, and political considerations are found to be of overriding
importance.").
81. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (public interest mandate does not empower
the FPC to regulate the employment practices of licensees; discrimination policy is irrelevant
to agency's statutory mandate to provide plentiful supplies of energy at just prices, and the
words "public interest" in the regulatory statute do not create a mandate to promote the
general public welfare); McLean Trucking Co., 321 U.S. at 85 (although the Interstate Com-
merce Act envisions incorporation of antitrust policy, it is to be applied only to the extent
that it helps achieve the goals of national transportation policy).
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In a number of cases the FCC has been allowed to incorporate other
national policies into the public interest requirements of the Communica-
tions Act. 2 Decisions in such cases typically hold that the Commission is
empowered to consider other national policies, but is not required to do
so.83 In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,84 networking regula-
tions were challenged as an attempt to "bootstrap" antitrust regulations
into the Communications Act.85 The Court held that it was permissible for
the Commission to consider antitrust policies to the extent "network prac-
tices prevent the maximum utilization of radio facilities in the public
interest." 86
The Court overruled the incorporation of antitrust policy in FCC v. RCA
Communications, Inc. 87 because the FCC failed to make the determination
that such policies would serve the public interest in radio and telegraph
services.88 The FCC had authorized the opening of two new overseas radio
and telegraph circuits in areas already served by RCA on the theory that
duplicate facilities would promote competition consistent with national ec-
onomic policies.89 The Court remanded the case to the FCC, concluding
that the Commission could not incorporate such policies absent a finding,
based on the agency's expert judgment, that licensing would promote bet-
ter radio service. 90
82. National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (antitrust pol-
icy); National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (antitrust policy); accord NAACP v.
FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 670 n.7 (1976) (discussing incorporation of policies against racial dis-
crimination into the FCC public interest standard).
83. National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 795; National Broadcasting
Co., 319 U.S. at 222-24; Rogers Radio Communications Serv., 593 F.2d at 1233 (allegation of
anticompetitive conduct does not automatically trigger license renewal hearings); National
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 525 F.2d at 645-46 (although a Commission ruling sanc-
tioned potential anticompetitive effects, court upheld it).
84. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
85. Id at 222-24. Petitioner maintained that § 311 of the Communications Act, which
allows the Commission to deny a license to any applicant convicted of an antitrust violation,
could not be applied to parties who might be violating antitrust policy but were unconvicted.
Any attempt to do so, it was argued, was either an attempt to exceed the statutory authority
granted the Commission, or an effort to usurp the function of the Attorney General to en-
force antitrust laws. The Court concluded that the Commission had no authority to enforce
the antitrust laws, but that it could consider the national policy against economic concentra-
tion to the extent challenged practices affected the delivery of radio services. Id
86. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 224.
87. 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
88. Id. at 91.
89. Id at 88-89.
90. Id. at 98. The court stated that the FCC could not give controlling weight to a
generalized expression by Congress that competition is in the public interest. Rather, the
Commission was directed to apply its expertise to determine the public interest consistent
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Courts have held consistently that the FCC is not empowered to enforce
the laws it incorporates into the public interest standard, nor is it bound by
rulings of other federal agencies that are entrusted with enforcement. 9 '
Rather, the FCC must make its own determination of the licensee's com-
pliance with the incorporated policy, and apply it only so far as the policy
is relevant to the Commission's statutory mandate. 92
Courts have taken the same approach to incorporation of antidis-
crimination statutes, allowing the FCC to analyze the employment prac-
tices of licensees "only to the extent those practices affect the obligation of
the licensee to provide programming that 'fairly reflects the tastes and the
viewpoints of minority groups,' and to the extent those practices raise
questions about the character qualifications of the licensee." '93 Unlike the
agencies charged with enforcing antidiscrimination laws, the FCC is usu-
ally concerned with prospective remedies since its primary concern is to
improve the overall structure of broadcasting.94 Because of its forward-
looking approach, the FCC does not often conduct hearings on license re-
newal applications because of allegations of discriminatory practices. 95
Generally, the FCC has been accorded substantial discretion by review-
ing courts in making public interest determinations. The Commission has
been allowed, but not required, to incorporate other national policies into
its interpretation of the public interest. But in taking this approach, the
Supreme Court made clear in RCA Communications that the agency may
not abdicate its responsibility to define the public interest in the name of
with its statutory mandate. It could not simply rely on "what it deemed a national policy,"
id at 94, to define the public interest. Id at 91-98.
91. See, e.g., National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 795 ("the Commis-
sion does not have the power to enforce the antitrust laws as such ...."); National Broad-
casting Co., 319 U.S. at 223-24 (FCC is not empowered to enforce the Sherman Act);
Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media, 595 F.2d at 628 ("the FCC is not the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and a license renewal proceeding is not a
Title VI suit."); National Org. For Women, 555 F.2d at 1016-18 (FCC does not enforce equal
employment laws per se, and is not bound by rulings of the EEOC).
92. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. at 91-98.
93. Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media, 595 F.2d at 628 (quoting National Org.
For Women, 555 F.2d at 1017); accord NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 670 n.7 (1976).
The requirement that minority tastes and needs be met dates back to the Blue Book and is
based on the overall programming diversity goal. The policy was developed to promote a
"well balanced programming structure" and did not apply, at least initially, to minorities in
an ethnic sense. See supra note 29.
94. See Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media, 595 F.2d at 628.
95. Id; see National Org. For Women, 555 F.2d at 1016-17. It is not sufficient for one
challenging a license to merely allege discriminatory conduct on the part of the licensee.
There must be proof that license renewal would be prima facie inconsistent with the public
interest. National Org. For Women, 555 F.2d at 1005. See also Alianza Federal de Mercedes
v. FCC, 539 F.2d 732, 736 (1976); Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 322 (1972).
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other congressional pronouncements, but must make its own public inter-
est determination.96
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE HEARING IMPAIRED
It has been estimated that at least thirteen million people in the United
States suffer some hearing loss,97 and that of this number, approximately
two million are profoundly deaf.98 Aware of the needs of this special popu-
lation, the FCC over the last decade has been developing experimental
programs that serve the deaf.99
.1. FCC Effortsfor the Hearing Impaired
Except for a rule requiring television stations to caption emergency
broadcasts,"°° there are no formal requirements for the hearing impaired
imposed on licensees by the FCC.' ° The Commission considered but spe-
cifically rejected a requirement that the handicapped be among those con-
sulted during ascertainment procedures."0 2 The agency proposed, however,
that broadcasters have the option under the "other" category of the com-
munity leader checklist, to consult groups that are not listed, such as the
hearing impaired. 10 3
Although the Commission has not taken formal steps to provide pro-
gramming guidelines for the hearing impaired, it has granted all requests
from individual broadcasters seeking to innovate in this area." In 1972,
the FCC granted authority to the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) to
conduct experiments with "closed" captioning, a system that would allow
hearing impaired individuals to receive visual information with their tele-
96. 346 U.S. at 91-98. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
97. Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d 378, 379 (1976).
98. Id at 389.
99. See infra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
100. Captioning of Emergency Messages, 61 F.C.C.2d 18 (1976), reconsideration denied,
62 F.C.C.2d 565 (1977). See Use of Telecasts to Inform & Alert Viewers With Impaired
Hearing, 26 F.C.C.2d 917 (1970) (suggestion by FCC that television broadcasters should,
whenever possible, employ newscasters that enable listeners to lip read, and use visual an-
nouncements and materials).
101. See Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d at 389.
102. Amendment of the Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems, (Docket No.
78-237) FCC 80-134, (released April 4, 1980).
103. Id The community leader checklist includes those groups whose views must be
ascertained in Commission decisionmaking. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 301; Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d at 380
(Commission has frequently encouraged licensees to use procedures that make information
available to the hearing impaired).
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vision programs."°5 Based on this experiment, PBS filed a petition for
rulemaking requesting that certain portions of the broadcast signal be re-
served exclusively for captioning. 116 Due to a number of technical and ec-
onomic uncertainties, the Commission declined to make such an exclusive
reservation. 0 7 But it did adopt rules allowing further use of "closed" cap-
tions, thus clearing the way for full-scale development. 10 8 Based on this
policy, PBS and two of the commercial networks, beginning in March
1980, embarked on a project to provide up to twenty hours per week of
captioned programming. 0 9 The third commercial network-Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS)-is experimenting with an alternative form of
presenting visual information." 0 The FCC has not confined itself only to
105. License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d at 454. "Closed" captioning involves
use of an encoder that sends program captions with the television signal using line 21 of the
vertical blanking space. Special decoding machines are then attached to the television sets of
the hearing impaired, allowing them to receive a visual display of the aural message. While
those without such devicies receive a normal picture. "Open" captioning superimposes cap-
tions on all viewers' screens and is currently employed in rebroadcasts of the ABC Evening
News by PBS. Id
106. Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d 378 (1976).
107. Id at 389. Despite PBS experience with captioning, a number of questions remain
unanswered. For example, can other services be provided to television audiences on the part
of the spectrum that PBS proposed be reserved exclusively for captions? Will exclusive use
of the signal for closed captions preclude superior technologies, such as teletext? See infra
note 110 and accompanying text. Should encoding devices be built in to television sets, or is
it more effective to add them to the sets of the hearing impaired?
Economic questions also remain. Estimates of capital costs for captioning range from
$25,000 to over $500,000. And the cost of captioning a single program runs anywhere be-
tween $1,000 and $7,600. See Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d at 384-85. The Commis-
sion weighed the potential benefits of captioning against the possible loss of service from
making an exclusive reservation of a portion of the broadcast signal and chose not to require
captioning. Id at 388.
108. "By today's action we have taken captioning-for-the-deaf out of the realm of experi-
mentation and given it a green light to develop as a permanent service." Id at 392 (separate
statement of Comm'r Washburn).
109. See License Renewal Applications, 72 F.C.C.2d 273, 281 (1979). The project re-
sulted from a cooperative effort between PBS and the National Bureau of Standards with
funding from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to develop captioning tech-
nology. HEW helped fund and establish the National Captioning Institute, which prepares
captions for the programs. As another part of the project, Sears, Roebuck & Co. agreed to
market decoding devices to the hearing impaired on a nonprofit basis. In addition to PBS,
commercial networks involved in the project included NBC and ABC. Id at 281.
Nine programs on commercial networks and fifteen PBS series were captioned during the
Fall 1980 television season. Got/fried, 655 F.2d at 303 n.18. Recently, however, NBC has
indicated its hesitancy to remain in the captioning program because far fewer decoders have
been sold than expected (23,000 against a projected figure of 100,000) and because caption-
ing is costing the network $1 million per year. Carmody, The TV Column, The Washington
Post, Mar. 8, 1982, at B 10, col. 2.
110. CBS is presently involved in the development of teletext, a system that would allow
the transmission of letters, numbers, or other characters to television sets equipped with
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supporting the deaf. The Commission has also helped handicapped per-
sons find jobs with broadcasters."'
The thrust of the FCC policy of licensee responsibility for the hearing
impaired has been to encourage service, but not to require it. 1 1 2 The deci-
sion as to how the deaf would best be served is a matter of licensee discre-
tion. 3 However, the Commission has plainly stated that if experimental
programs fall short of meeting the needs of the hearing impaired, it will
consider adopting rules to compel such service." 4
B. Section 504 and Public Television
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enacted to secure social services and
employment opportunities for handicapped individuals." 5 Section 504 is a
miscellaneous provision that prohibits recipients of federal financial assist-
ance from discriminating against otherwise qualified handicapped per-
sons." 6 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare adopted
expansive definitions which included federal licensees among those grants
that would bring a recipient within the mandate of section 504.1" How-
ever, the Justice Department, which has the responsibility of coordinating
Rehabilitation Act enforcement efforts, has interpreted federal financial
assistance to exclude licensees." 8
special decoders. Teletext differs from captioning because it can provide services for the
general public, as well as for the deaf, including weather reports, news, comparative shop-
ping prices and community bulletins. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 81-493, at 2
(released Nov. 27, 1981). The FCC has proposed rules to allow the transmission of teletext
based on petitions of CBS and the United Kingdom Teletext Industry Group. Id at 1. The
National Captioning Institute has expressed concern that teletext will interfere with existing
services for the hearing impaired, while others urge that development of teletext will result
in far superior service for the deaf. Id at App. B.
11. The FCC's program consists of a clearinghouse that provides information to broad-
casters to assist them in employing handicapped individuals. See Amendment of Broadcast
Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and FCC Form 395, FCC 80-62 (released Mar. 6,
1980).
112. See Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d at 389.
113. Id
114. License Application Renewal, 72 F.C.C.2d at 281.
We expect that the closed captioning project will be a success. However, if at a later
date it is demonstrated that the project is not successful in making television pro-
gramming more available and enjoyable to the hearing impaired, then it may be
necessary for the Commission to determine if rulemaking is warranted to ensure
that the hearing impaired are not deprived of the benefits of television.
Id
115. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See supra note 10.
117. 45 C.F.R. § 84.81 (1981). The responsibility for the guidelines was later shifted to
the Department of Education. See supra note 13.
118. Nondiscrimination Based on Handicap, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,620, 37,632 (June 3, 1980).
Catholic University Law Review
Noncommercial broadcast licensees, however, are direct recipients of
federal funds. 1 9 It is the monetary grant that creates potential liability
under section 504, making unnecessary an inquiry into the extent to which
licenses themselves trigger the statute. Based on this reasoning, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, determined in late 1979 that sec-
tion 504 applies to public broadcasters and began to develop compliance
guidelines.'"I The Department was reorganized before the task was ac-
complished, and the responsibility shifted to the Department of Education
(DOE).' Finally, in January 1981, under a federal court order, DOE is-
sued a notice of intent to develop regulations for enforcement of Section
504 on public television stations.122
Before the DOE developed section 504 guidelines, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, in Got/ried v. FCC,2 3 imposed an obligation on public
television stations to provide programming for the hearing impaired. This
decision was reached despite the FCC's determination that the public in-
terest would be better served by voluntary programs for the deaf.12 4
119. Public television stations receive funds under 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979). A primary means of distributing such funds is through the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting (CPB), a nonprofit corporation created by the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.
See generally Note, supra note 31, for a discussion of funding of public broadcasting. Be-
tween 1975 and 1980 the Public Broadcasting Act authorized $634 million in matching
grants to be disbursed to public stations through CPB (one dollar in federal support for each
two dollars and fifty cents in nonfederal money). CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCAST-
ING, AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING 13 (Feb. 10, 1977). The Department of Edu-
cation funds production of television programs for use by public television stations. 20
U.S.C. § 3201(a)(2) (1976). Grants for construction of broadcasting facilities are provided
through the Department of Commerce. 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-394 (1976).
120. Gotfried, 655 F.2d at 306-07 & 307 n.41.
121. Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (1976 Supp. IV
1980).
122. Notice of Intent to Develop Regulations for Nondiscrimination on Basis of Handi-
cap, 46 Fed. Reg. 4954 (Jan. 19, 1981) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 104), corrected, 46 Fed.
Reg. 18,321 (Mar. 24, 1981) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 104). Since that time, the United
States District Court for the Central District of California has ordered the Department of
Education to adopt regulations requiring open captioning of all federally funded programs
broadcast by public stations. Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness v. Community Tele-
vision, Civ. No. CV 78-4715R (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1981), stayed, No. 81-5952 (9th Cir. Dec.
29, 1981).
123. 655 F.2d at 297.
124. Id
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III. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT AS AGENCY PARTNER:
FIRST AMONG EQUALS
A. A "'Mandatory Incorporation" Doctrine
Despite the recent decision in WNCN Listeners Guild,125 in which the
Supreme Court championed FCC discretionary authority, the District of
Columbia Circuit in Gottfried ruled that the mandate of section 504 must
be incorporated into the Communications Act public interest requirements
for public television licenses. 126 The court also ruled that the Commission
must incorporate the national policy of nondiscrimination embodied in the
Rehabilitation Act with respect to commercial licensees, but left the
agency free to determine the most appropriate method of implementing
this policy. 2 ' The court's position can be termed a "mandatory incorpora-
tion" doctrine.' 2 '
The ruling, in effect, made mandatory what before had been left to the
agency's discretion,' 29 and is therefore inconsistent with prior law in at
least two ways. First, Gottfried seized from the Commission the authority
to define the contours of the public interest,' 30 an issue which seemingly
had been settled by the Supreme Court in WNCN Listeners Guild less than
a month before Gottfried was decided.' Second, it sanctioned a view of
125. 452 U.S. 582, 596 (1981).
126. 655 F.2d at 307 ("[T]he FCC is obligated to take account of a public broadcaster's
legal duties under Section 504 in making its public interest determinations.").
127. Id at 315-16. The court based its reluctance to require renewal hearings for the
seven commercial stations on the fact that the policy expressed by the Rehabilitation Act
was general While the nondiscrimination provision of § 504, which applied to public sta-
tions, was specific. See supra note 21. The court deferred to the expert judgment of the
agency to find the most effective means of encouraging commercial stations to program for
the hearing impaired. "Recognizing that the Commission possesses special competence in
weighing the factors of technological feasibility and economic viability that the concept of
the public interest must embrace, we defer today to its judgment." Id at 315-16. The court
offered no explanantion of how technological or economic factors would differ for public
stations, or why the Commission deserves a lower standard of deference on public interest
decisions involving such stations.
128. Incorporation of other national policies had previously been left to agency discre-
tion. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. By deciding as a matter of law that
service to the hearing impaired is required by the public interest standard, the District of
Columbia Circuit deprived the FCC of the discretion to address the problem in its own way.
129. The Goitfried court ordered the FCC to incorporate the Rehabilitation Act into the
public interest standard. 655 F.2d at 307. Incorporation of other national policies had previ-
ously been discretionary with the agency. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
131. For a decade, the court and the Commission struggled over whether, as a matter of
law, the court could order hearings in format change cases. See supra notes 42-53 and ac-
companying text. The format cases were a source of tension between the agency and the
District of Columbia Circuit, and resulted in the FCC's refusal to follow the court's guide-
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the public interest which focused on the needs of one minority, seemingly
to the exclusion of the tastes, needs or interests of the audience at large.' 32
Although the needs of the hearing impaired audience are indisputably sig-
nificant, to mandate programming for the deaf without considering the
possible effects of the ruling on the industry and the total audience is in-
consistent with the Commission's statutory mandate to promote the effec-
tive use of broadcasting for the net benefit of the audience. 133
The Gottfried court attempted to clear up the apparent inconsistency by
pointing to nondiscrimination policies that the Commission had adopted
and which the court had ordered the FCC to enforce.' 34 These policies,
however, had been adopted by the Commission due to its own interpreta-
tion of the public interest, not as a result of a rigid incorporation require-
ment.135 Furthermore, where the court had ordered enforcement of these
policies, the FCC was merely required to enforce previously adopted
guidelines-not to incorporate other national policies.' 36 Moreover, adop-
tion of policies prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or sex was
not a signal from the Commission that the public interest was directed
toward serving minorities as an end in itself. Instead, service to minority
groups was required as a means of implementing the established public
interest goal of programming diversity. 137 The Supreme Court's opinion in
lines set down in Citizen's Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
For a discussion of the tension between the FCC and the court, see Reversing the D. C Circuit
at the FCC, REGULATION May-June 1981, at 11-14. See also Note, supra note 42, at 363
nn. 10-11 (discussion of FCC refusal to follow guidelines set down in WEFM).
132. Prior holdings concentrated on the public interest as a whole, not on particularized
segments. See supra note 64. The Gottfried opinion, on the other hand, contained no discus-
sion of how broadcasting service would be improved overall by the decision. The opinion
examined only the needs of the hearing impaired vis a vis the public interest.
133. See supra note 64.
134. 655 F.2d at 309-10.
135. See id at 309 (FCC adopted equal employment policies based on its independent
assessment of the public interest).
136. Id Regarding antidiscrimination policies the court stated: "[wihere the Commission
has lagged in accepting its responsibility, this court has not hesitated to direct it to do so."
Id In support of this proposition, however, the court cited two cases, neither of which in-
volved the incorporation of other national policies. Rather, they were cases in which the
FCC was ordered to comply with its preexisting guidelines. Black Broadcasting Coalition v.
FCC, 556 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (affirmative action regulations); Office of Communica-
tion of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (fairness
doctrine).
137. "This Court's cases have consistently held that the use of the words 'public interest'
in a regulatory statute is not a broad license to promote the general public welfare. Rather,
the words take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory legislation." NAACP v. FPC,
425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976). See Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media, 595 F.2d at 628
(service to minorities is part of the overall public interest in promoting programming diver-
sity); supra note 93.
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RCA Communications requires such an approach. The Commission cannot
rely on congressional pronouncements of policy as an index of the public
interest, but must make its own finding as to whether the policy will foster
the purposes of the Communications Act. 138 The holding in RCA Commu-
nications is flatly inconsistent with a mandatory incorporation approach.
Applied to the facts of Gottfried, the RCA Communications holding means
that the FCC should make its own assessment of the wisdom of sanctions
against licensees, and should not rely solely upon a congressional policy
requiring service for the deaf.
Even if previous antidiscrimination laws had been applied to the public
interest standard, it does not necessarily follow that the Communications
Act also encompasses the antidiscrimination provisions of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. To require captioning for the deaf imposes technical and eco-
nomic burdens on broadcasters and could potentially result in a disruption
of service to the general audience.' 39 Although service to a hearing im-
paired minority might support the recognized programming diversity goal,
the overall detrimental effect precludes a finding that incorporation of the
Rehabilitation Act serves the public interest."4 This scenario contrasts
sharply with antidiscrimination statutes based on race or sex. Compliance
with such laws requires no technical or economic changes by broadcasters,
nor does it disrupt overall program service.' 4 ' Therefore, even if antidis-
crimination statutes were considered to be per se in the public interest, that
would not necessarily mean that the Rehabilitation Act, as applied in Gott-
fried, requires broadcasters to adopt costly new technologies.
The Gottfried decision also raises the possibility that the FCC's ability to
adjust to the changing needs of the broadcasting field will be sharply cur-
tailed. To the extent other national policies are tied to the public interest
standard, the more the Commission becomes locked in to policies adopted
138. See supra note 90.
139. A number of technical and economic questions about captioning remain unan-
swered. See supra note 107. Public broadcasters claim that a captioning requirement would
significantly increase programming costs and result in a reduction in service. It would also
cause production delays in programs and would limit the number and types of programs
that could be made available. Also, captioning could interfere with the visual content of
programming. See Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief Amici Curiae of Corporation
for Public Broadcasting, Public Broadcasting Service, and National Association of Public
Television Stations in Support of Petitions for Writ of Certiorari, Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d
297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982). See supra note 11.
140. The public interest is based on overall broadcasting service and involves weighing
competing policies. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
141. Eliminating programming that reflects a racial or sexual bias merely involves ad-
justing broadcast schedules. Such alterations are minor compared to a requirement that
broadcasters install costly captioning technology.
19821
Catholic University Law Review
by Congress that bear little or no relation to broadcasting. Following the
court's reasoning to its logical conclusion, the FCC has expressed concern
that other less closely related legislation will be incorporated into the pub-
lic interest mandate. 4' Laws banning discrimination based on age 143 or
sex' by recipients of federal funds would be among the first that would
have to be included under the Gottfried standard. 45 Others would follow
as Congress discovered new important national policies. Such a result
plainly contradicts the Supreme Court holding in WNCN Listeners Guild
that government supervision of a licensee's programming choices is not in
the public interest.' 46 It threatens to transform the public interest standard
from "a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body
which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy' 47 into a
mechanistic formula, its meaning preordained by a variety of legislative
enactments having little relevance to broadcasting.
B. The FCC's Role in the Regulatory Framework Demoted to "Junior
Partner?"
Beyond the determination that the public interest standard requires in-
corporation of the Rehabilitation Act, the Gottfried court reached several
other conclusions to justify the decision to order license renewal hearings.
In reaching its decision, the District of Columbia Circuit found implicitly
that noncommercial station KCET-TV had not met the needs of the deaf,
that implementation of licensing sanctions to aid the hearing impaired out-
weighed other public interest needs and that enforcement through individ-
142. Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1982). See supra note 11.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1976) which provides that "no person in the United States
shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."
144. Existing FCC policies prohibit discrimination in the employment practices of licen-
sees based on sex. A provision similar to § 504, but directed toward gender-based discrimi-
nation exists in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). It provides that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." This requirement could presumably be incorporated into the public
interest standard to apply to licensees' programming.
145. "If Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act must be incorporated into the public inter-
est standard, then it could certainly be argued that 42 U.S.C. § 6102 & 20 U.S.C. § 1681
must be included as well." Petition for Writ of Certiorari of the FCC, No. 81-799, Gottfried
v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982). See
supra note 11.
146. 452 U.S. 582, 595-96 (1981).
147. Id at 593.(quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)).
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ual licensing proceedings would be the most appropriate course of
action. 4 ' Such decisions are the essence of policymaking, and had previ-
ously been committed to agency discretion. 4 9 In effect, the court in Gott-
fried demoted the Commission to the status of "junior partner" in the
regulatory relationship.
Although the court failed to articulate specific findings beyond its deter-
uination that section 504 must be incorporated, hearings would not have
been required absent the factual conclusion that license renewal for
KCET-TV was "prima facie inconsistent with the public interest."' 50 In
WNCN Listeners Guild, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's pol-
icy that evidentiary hearings should be ordered only upon finding that the
licensee had been acting "unreasonably or in bad faith."'' Since the Com-
mission made no such finding with respect to station KCET, 52 the District
of Columbia Circuit apparently made an independent factual determina-
tion. 53 Had the court limited its role to resolving the issue of law, it would
have decided the requirements of the public interest standard only, and
remanded the case to the FCC to evaluate the licensee's performance. 54
Instead, the court assumed the Commission's role, thus depriving the
agency of the level of discretionary authority contemplated in the partner-
148. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of issues which must
be resolved before hearings are ordered.
149. See supra note 80.
150. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1976). See supra notes 15 & 94.
151. 452 U.S. at 602 (quoting Mississippi Authority for Educ. TV, 71 F.C.C.2d 1296,
1308 (1969)).
152. See License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d 451; License Renewal Applications,
72 F.C.C.2d 273 (1979), denying reconsideration of 69 F.C.C.2d 451 (1978). Few facts in the
record support a finding of unreasonable action by KCET-TV. Despite the fact that ascer-
tainment regulations did not require the station to seek out members of the hearing impaired
community, KCET-TV consulted with several GLAD officers. 69 F.C.C.2d at 457 n.7. While
the only specific allegation levelled at KCET in the petition to deny the license was that the
station refused to air broadcasts of the Captioned ABC News, that situation had been cor-
rected by May 23, 1977. Id at 457-58 n.8. During the license period in question, KCET-TV
aired more than 960 programs for the hearing impaired, or about six such shows per week.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari of KCET-TV, No. 81-298, Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982). See supra note 11. Also,
by 1980, PBS, which supplies programming to KCET-TV, had significantly expanded its
offerings for the hearing impaired. See supra note 109.
153. The Gottfried opinion contained no reference to the performance of KCET-TV dur-
ing the challenged license period. However, the court's decision to order renewal hearings
indicates an assumption that a substantial or material question of fact had been raised on the
issue of the station's performance.
154. The general presumption is to avoid hearings whenever possible. See supra note 72.
In license renewal proceedings, the Commission will usually seek additional information on
matters that are unresolved rather than order hearings. See Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on
Mass Media, 595 F.2d at 630 n.34.
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ship doctrine"' and prior case law.' 5 6
The court also usurped the FCC's function of weighing competing pub-
lic interest policies. The Commission has always tempered its enforcement
of particular public interest concerns with a recognition that the purpose of
the Communications Act is to promote quality service in the broadcasting
system as a whole.' 57 This balancing approach was applied by the Com-
mission to the problems of the hearing impaired, and the potential benefits
to the specialized population were weighed against the possible detrimen-
tal effects on overall service.' 58 The FCC chose not to mandate the use of
experimental captioning technologies, and concluded that the public inter-
est did not call for requirements to be placed on individual licensees.' 59
The Gottfried court upset this balance by imposing an immediate require-
ment of service for the hearing impaired to be enforced through licensing
procedures. 160 The holding not only disregarded prior decisions that allo-
cated the choice of competing policies to the Commission,' 6 ' but it
thwarted the agency's public interest concerns in its approach to the
problems of the hearing impaired.
The Gott/ried decision will require licensees to choose immediately a
method of serving the deaf or risk losing their license, which could stifle
the development of captioning technology. The Commission declined
adoption of an exclusive reservation of a portion of the television signal for
closed captioning because it was convinced that such a rule would hamper
innovation in the field.' 6 2 The agency also concluded that awaiting the
perfection of systems such as teletext, which provides service to hearing
audiences as well as the deaf, would ultimately make captioning more ac-
cessable to the hearing impaired by driving down the cost of decoding de-
vices. 6 1 But the Gottfried ruling will force licensees to choose currently
available methods of serving the deaf, making it unlikely that there will be
substantial capital outlays made in the future to replace the old systems
155. The partnership doctrine places the fact finding function in the regulatory agency-
not the court. See supra note 9.
156. E.g., RCA Communications, 346 U.S. at 91 ("Ours is not the duty of reviewing deter-
minations of 'fact' in the narrow, colloquial scope of that concept.").
157. See supra note 64.
158. See supra note 106.
159. Id
160. "It is time for the Commission to act realistically to require, in the public interest,
that the benefits of television be made available to the hard of hearing now." 655 F.2d at
301.
161. See supra notes 106-07.
162. Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d at 388. See supra note 106.
163. Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d at 388. See supra note 110.
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with improved ones. 64 Consequently, abandonment of the Commission's
policy of promoting experimentation and development of alternative cap-
tioning systems, in favor of an immediate requirement of service for the
deaf, could result in the installation of inferior systems to serve the hearing
impaired.
The Gottfried decision also frustrates the FCC policy of fundamental
fairness toward its licensees 65 by making KCET-TV accountable for fail-
ing to satisfy requirements that did not exist during the license term under
consideration. Although renewal was predicated on the station's perform-
ance from 1974 to 1977, the court relied on a 1979 Department of Health,
Education and Welfare determination that for the first time held section
504 applicable to public television stations.166 Retroactive application of
section 504 must have been a surprise to the station management of
KCET-TV, since the FCC, during the 1974-77 license term, had expressly
rejected requirements that licensees air programs for the deaf, 67 and be-
cause guidelines still do not exist for enforcement of section 504 in public
television. 168 Not only was the Gottfried decision unfair to the particular
station involved, it also undermined a basic premise of the public interest
standard that was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in National Citizen's
Committee for Broadcasting-that uncertainty, unfairness and disruption
of licensees should be avoided.'
69
Another effect of Gottfried was to place a more stringent burden on pub-
lic compared to commercial broadcasters by holding the former immedi-
ately accountable for compliance with section 504, while allowing the
latter to demonstrate future good faith efforts to meet the general national
policy embodied in the Rehabilitation Act. 170 The ruling contradicts the
existing FCC policy of treating commercial and noncommercial broadcast-
ers alike. 17 It also confficts with a basic premise of public broadcasting,
that federal funds should not be used as a lever to control programming
164. See supra note 106.
165. Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 699-700 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 926 (1975) (licensing criteria should be known in advance); National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 804 (Court upheld FCC divestiture policy designed to avoid un-
certainty and unfairness toward licensees). In Gotifried, the Commission concluded that ap-
plication of § 504 would violate its existing policy toward treatment of licensees, by placing
retroactive licensing requirements on broadcasters and thwarting the notion of fundamental
fairness. See License Application Renewal, 72 F.C.C.2d at 279.
166. Goifried, 655 F.2d at 303 n.22.
167. Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d at 389.
168. See supra note 13.
169. National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 804-05.
170. Gottfried, 655 F.2d 297.
171. See supra note 31.
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content. 172
By ordering compliance with section 504, the Gottfried court ignored the
balance of competing public interest policies set by the Commission, upset
policies with respect to licensees, and threatened to institutionalize cap-
tioning systems that could result in poorer quality service to both the hear-
ing impaired and the general audience. The decision also vitiates the
partnership doctrine, under which such policy choices should be left to the
Commission, not the court.1
73
A third way in which the Gotifried court usurped the agency's function
was by dictating the method by which the public interest mandate must be
enforced. Although the court paid lip service to agency discretion in this
area by noting the FCC's choice of procedural options, it limited the Com-
mission's choice to licensing sanctions. 174 Yet the Supreme Court recently
affirmed in WNCN Listeners Guild the proposition that public interest pol-
172. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, an interesting question posed by the
Gottried decision is the extent to which it can be reconciled with the legislative purpose of
the Public Broadcasting Act, under which federal funds are provided to noncommercial
broadcasters. One of the primary concerns expressed prior to the Act's adoption was that
federal funds should not involve the government in programming decisions. See Public Tele-
vision Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1160, Subcomm. on Communications, Senate Commerce
Comm., 90 Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967) (statement of Sen. Pastore); Hearings on H.R. 6736,
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1967) (state-
ment of Rep. Brown); S. REP. No. 222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 11 (1967). See generally Note,
Freeing Public Broadcastingfrom Unconstitutional Restraints, 89 YALE L.J. 719 (1980) (dis-
cussion of legislative history and validity of controls imposed through federal funds).
Two prior decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit make the Gottfried decision even
more difficult to reconcile. In Community Serv. Broadcasting of Mid-America v. FCC, 593
F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court struck down a regulation that required public stations,
but not commercial stations, to maintain recordings of public affairs broadcasts. The court
said that the commercial/noncommercial distinction failed to justify the more stringent re-
quirement for public broadcasters. Id at 1110. In other words, the mere fact that public
stations receive federal funds does not allow the government to exert programming controls.
Yet that is precisely what § 504 allows under the Gottfried rationale. In Accuracy in Media
v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975) the court refused to compel the FCC to enforce
fairness controls on public broadcasters, the enforcement of which had been delegated to the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The Gottfried court attempted to distinguish Accuracy
ii Media, claiming it did not prevent the FCC from enforcing public interest obligations,
such as the fairness doctrine (and by analogy, § 504) on public broadcasters. Gotfried, 655
F.2d at 309 n.48. However, the court did not explain how the imposition of controls which,
like § 504, are predicated on the use of federal funds, can be justified in light of the legisla-
tive history of public broadcasting and the decision in Community Service Broadcasting of
Mid-America.
173. See supra note 9.
174. The court said the Commission could choose from among a variety of dispositional
alternatives, including short-term or conditional license renewal as well as standard renewal
or denial. 655 F.2d at 311.
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icies need not be implemented through licensing sanctions.'75 And it is
well established by prior cases that industry-wide problems are more effec-
tively handled through rulemaking than through individual hearings. 176
The Gottfried opinion cannot be reconciled with these holdings, since it
ordered the Commission to employ individual sanctions to remedy a per-
vasive social problem.
By limiting the Commission's discretion to choose from other disposi-
tional alternatives to serve the hearing impaired, the Gottfried decision
risks burdening a significant number of public stations with costly and
time-consuming renewal hearings; a prospect that could lead to a reduc-
tion of service to the public, since resources would have to be diverted
from programming to regulatory matters. 77 Such a policy is ill-suited to
solve the problems of the hearing impaired, since the technology involved
in a captioning system must be adopted uniformly-as could be achieved
through rulemaking.'
78
C. The Gotefried Decision: Was the FCC Required to Incorporate or
Enforce Section 504?
The District of Columbia Circuit characterized its Gottfried holding as
requiring the FCC to incorporate section 504 into the public interest stan-
dard to "effectuate the underlying national policy" without simultaneously
empowering the agency to adjudicate violations of the Rehabilitation
Act.17 9 This statement of the holding, insofar as the agency is not empow-
175. The court ruled it was not necessary for the Commission to supervise programming
formats through licensing sanctions. 452 U.S. 482 (1981).
176. See supra note 30.
177. A license renewal hearing may in some cases, be as serious a sanction as denying the
license, especially for small stations, many of which are noncommercial. A petition to deny a
license, even if no hearings are ordered, may cost a station $50,000 in legal fees. If hearings
are held, costs substantially increase. Thirteen years ago, license renewal proceedings for
station WMAL cost $400,000. See B. COLE & M. OTTINGER, THE RELUCTANT REGULATORS
213-14 (1978). Public broadcasters are currently facing "difficult financial stress," making
the prospect of renewal hearings even more burdensome. Amici Curiae Brief of Corporation
for Public Broadcasting, Public Broadcasting Service, and National Association of Public
Television Stations in Support of Petitions for Writ of Certiorari, Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d
297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 998 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982). During 1982, approxi-
mately 90 of the nation's 300 public stations will apply for renewal, and all of them could be
subjected to hearings as a result of the Gottfried decision. Id; Petition of FCC, No. 81-799,
supra note 145 at 21.
178. See Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d at 388 (technical and economic questions
still remain with respect to captioning, and certain types, such as open and closed caption-
ing, may not be mutually compatible. The Commission has stated it will consider adoption
of rules if the policy of licensee discretion is not successful. License Renewal Applications,
72 F.C.C.2d at 281.
179. "In pursuing the public policy represented by Section 504 it is not the function of
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ered to enforce other national policies, is consistent with prior law.' 80
However, the result reached in Gottfried, whereby the public station was
required to undergo license renewal hearings which the commercial sta-
tions were not, indicates the inconsistency in the court's reasoning.
KCET-TV, a public station, was held to a more stringent public interest
standard because of the "specific statutory mandate" of section 504 as op-
posed to the more general nondiscrimination policy of the Rehabilitation
Act. 8 ' The Commission was ordered to impose this more exacting re-
quirement even though the court acknowledged that other agencies were
authorized to develop compliance guidelines.8 2 On the other hand, com-
mercial stations were subjected to the general nondiscrimination policy of
the Rehabilitation Act and were not required to undergo hearings. 18
3
The court's reasoning is not wholly consistent. If, as the court main-
tained, other national policies are to be used by the Commission as a "tool
by which [the] regulatory agency gives 'understandable content to the
broad statutory concept of the "public interest,"' 1184 then the degree of
specificity of the incorporated policy should be irrelevant to the Commis-
sion's response. Once programming for the hearing impaired was deter-
mined to be a public interest component, hearings should have been
required for commercial and noncommercial stations alike--or neither
should have been subjected to hearings, given the Commission's discretion
to find facts, make policy, and select appropriate procedural mechanisms.
But to hold that section 504 requires that only public stations face hearings
saddles the FCC with a duty of enforcing that section of the Rehabilitation
Act. In his dissent, Judge McGowan noted the inconsistent treatment of
commercial and noncommercial licensees, and said that to the extent the
public interest mandate extends to one, it should extend to both equally. 185
He pointed out that executive agencies have the responsibility of develop-
ing section 504 compliance guidelines, and that until they are fashioned,
station KCET-TV should be spared the time and expense of hearings. 86
Otherwise, if both the FCC and the executive departments are to enforce
the FCC to adjudicate law violations, or, indeed, to regard itself as bound strictly by the
specific dictates of the Rehabilitation Act or interpretive guidelines issued thereunder." 655
F.2d at 311.
180. See supra note 91.
181. 655 F.2d at 315.
182. Id at 310-11.
183. Id at 315-16.
184. Id at 308 (quoting Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika
Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 244 (1968)).
185. Id at 316-17 (McGowan, J., dissenting).
186. Id
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effectively section 504, those subject to the law will be faced with a variety
of directives from various agencies, each with its own compliance stan-
dard.'87 By adopting different compliance duties for commercial and non-
commercial broadcasters, the Gotfried court creates the potential for this
type of fragmented enforcement procedure. The decision requires the FCC
to implement the specific sanction of section 504, and thus conflicts with
prior decisions which prevent the agency from assessing law violations
under incorporated policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia Circuit in Gotyfried v. FCC adopted what may
be called a mandatory incorporation doctrine, under which regulatory
agencies are required to incorporate other national policies that intersect
their domain. This holding is unsupported by prior decisions which give
the FCC wide latitude in deciding what is required by the Communica-
tions Act, and by decisions that incorporation of other policies is allowed,
but not required, to define the public interest. But, even if the court had
been correct in ordering incorporation of the Rehabilitation Act, it erred
by denying to the Commission discretion to make factual findings, fashion
policy based on competing public interest needs, and to select procedures
other than licensing sanctions to fulfill the terms of the Communications
Act. Finally, the Gotqfried opinion is internally inconsistent; it recognized
the enforcement obligation of departments other than the FCC, yet or-
dered the Commission to apply the specific statutory requirements of sec-
tion 504 to public television stations. The net effect of the decision is to
strip the Commission of its discretionary power to interpret and implement
the public interest standard and to threaten development of captioning
technology due to the premature institution of costly sanctions on public
broadcasters. The Gotfried rationale emasculates the FCC, making a
working partnership between the court and the agency difficult, if not
impossible.
Robert L. Corn
187. A similar problem arose when the NAACP sought enforcement of affirmative action
guidelines against licensees regulated by the Federal Power Commission. Rejecting the
NAACP suit, Chief Justice Burger stated in his concurring opinion: "To the extent that the
judiciary orders administrative responsibility to be diffused, congressional intent is frus-
trated, regulated industries are subjected to the commands of different voices in the bureau-
cracy, and the agonizingly long administrative process grinds even more slowly." NAACP v.
FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 674 (1976) (emphasis in original).
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